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Abstract
In this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects at-
tach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure
to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game
which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both
values, we are able to classify subjects in diﬀerent categories: (i) 16%
of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the coop-
erative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the
cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if
the social dilemma was not an issue at all.
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1 Introduction
Traditional economic theory assumes that individuals behave as maximizing
an utility function whose unique input is their own payoﬀ. Such “egoistic”
picture of the world has been constantly challenged by experimental research
in prisoners’ dilemma and public good games, where a strong evidence of
cooperative behaviour is usually found (see the survey of Gintis et al., 2003).
Also, in quasi—real experiments, cooperation also appears in many diﬀerent
contexts and societies (see Henrich et al., 2001, for an extensive discussion).
The observed cooperative behaviour has triggered several theoretical ex-
planations based on altruism (Andreoni andMiller, 2000) or inequity aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), the assumption of self-regarding preferences being
replaced by other-regarding preferences (see Cox, 2004). Also, Rabin (1993)
develops models that incorporate perceptions of others’ intentions into the
utility of the players, that is, reciprocity. Finally, other models observe co-
operative gain seeking (Brandts and Schram, 1996).
Usually these games, think of the prisoners’ dilemma for instance, are
thought as implying a tension between self-centered and social-oriented goals,
which the decision maker needs to solve in either way. Hence, these games
can be considered as incorporating a social dilemma. By observing the played
actions, we simply observe the resolution of this conflict, but we do not get
any insight in how the decision maker perceives that conflict.
In this paper we follow a methodology based on the value of a game to get
knowledge of the extent of the “social dilemma” which these games entail.
Our idea is reminiscent of the concept of value of a game proposed by Shapley
(1953). This idea was brought into practical terms, applied to lotteries, by
Becker, DeGroot and Marshack (1964).
We carry a similar analysis applied to games. In treatment 1, we asked
subjects to value a prisoners’ dilemma game (PDG hereafter). Using a
within-subjects design we also asked the same subjects to value a closely
related game, one in which there is no social dilemma involved. By compar-
ing the values of the two games we can easily assess whether or not subjects
perceive both games as diﬀerent. To control any rank-order eﬀect we run
another experiment (treatment 2) which only included the PDG.
Our control treatment reveals that there is no rank-order eﬀect in our de-
sign. In treatment 1, we find that 54% of the subjects think of the prisoners’
dilemma game as not involving any social dilemma; the remaining subjects
modified their behaviour as the result of the emergence of this social dilemma.
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However, only 14 (up to 93) chosen the cooperative strategy.
After this introduction the paper is structured as follows. Next section 2
explains the experimental design and procedures. Section 3 shows the basic
results and the fourth section illustrates the added value of payment cards.
Results are discussed in section 5 and the last concludes.
2 The Experimental Design & Procedures
2.1 Design
Consider the following two games,
Game 1 Game 2
A B A B
A 4, 4 8, 3 A 4, 4 8, 3
B 3, 8 0,0 B 3, 8 7,7
Figure 1: Games 1 & 2
Observe that the second game is a prisoners’ dilemma game (our target)
and that the unique diﬀerence with respect to game 1 is the payoﬀ profile
associated to strategy B. In particular game 1 does have a Pareto eﬃcient
payoﬀ profile which coincides with the Nash equilibria payoﬀ profile of the
game. On the contrary, the PDG has a Pareto-eﬃcient outcome which does
not coincide with the unique Nash equilibrium payoﬀ. This fact introduces a
tension between self-oriented and social-oriented goals, arising what we call
in this paper a “social dilemma”.
Some explanation is needed here on our choice of the current payoﬀs
of the two games. As it has been reported as early as the sixties (see for
example Rapopport and Chammah (1965)), the choice of actual payoﬀs in
the PDG matters. In our experiment, we were interested in triggering as
much cooperative behaviour as possible, so we pushed the social-oriented
payoﬀ profile up to its maximum. This meant that the actual diﬀerence
between the two pure strategies of the PDG is a single euro. This single euro
can be interpreted as the cost of choosing the cooperative strategy. This
small cost was meant to make cooperation really attractive, enlarging in this
way the diﬀerences between game 1 and 2.
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Our research is based on the elicitation of the value of these two games for
diﬀerent subjects. However, rather than asking directly to the subjects which
would be the smallest amount of money for which they would be willing to
sell the game (as BDM did), we made them face a payments card, i.e. a set
of 10 decisions, in which subjects did have to choose whether they preferred
to play the game (against a unknown player randomly selected from the
subjects’ pool in the session) or to gain a sure amount of money. This sure
amount of money ranged from 1 to 10 euros. The reason for not following
the BDM procedure was that the this mechanism has been shown to be
notoriously unreliable. So we decided to facilitate subjects revelation of their
value of the game by making them face a sequential procedure rather than a
one-shot question, increasing gradually the amount of money to choose from.
The decision remained on the actual sequence of payoﬀs. Given that the
smaller the step, the larger the sequence of comparisons, we compromised
between a finer grade and a larger comparison procedure by choosing the
monetary step to be one euro.
Almost every theory of decision making suggests that the value of a game
is a kind of cut-oﬀ, in the sense that it is the amount of money at which the
subject switches from preferring the game to preferring the sure amount of
money. However, we have found that around 6% of the subjects failed to
display a cut-oﬀ of this type in their payment cards. We will explain below
why this happened.
One possible drawback of our design is the possibility that the current
order of the games had a sequential eﬀect. To control it, we ran two diﬀerent
treatments: Treatment 1, in which experimental subjects played both games,
and Treatment 2, in which experimental subjects only played the PDG.
2.2 Procedure
Our experiments were conducted at University of Jaén (Spain) and at Uni-
versity of Málaga (Spain). The distribution of experimental sessions is as
follows:
• Treatment 1 (main) was carried out during September 2002. A total
of 102 individuals participated in the four sessions: two sessions in
Jaén (52 participants) and the remaining two in Málaga (50 subjects).
Participants were volunteers from intermediate level economics courses.
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There was no show-up fee, the average earnings being around 8.3 euros
for the 30 minutes session.
• Treatment 2 (baseline) was performed during September 2003 and com-
prised two sessions in Málaga (55 individuals). Our experimental sub-
jects were selected purposefully to have identical training in Microe-
conomics than in treatment 1 to ensure in this way the homogeneity
of the samples. On average, this individuals earned 5.2 euros for the
twenty minutes session.
In each treatment and for each game, subjects were given a sheet of paper
containing the game (top of the sheet) and the payment card (bottom of the
sheet). They had to write down his selected strategy for the game and the
10 decisions regarding diﬀerent amounts of money. In the first treatment,
subjects received two sheets: one for game 1 and the other for game 2.
They were stapled in this order, together with a front page containing the
instructions. In the second treatment, they only received one sheet containing
game 2 and the instructions. The instructions were loudly spoken and all
questions raised by the experimental subjects were loudly answered before
starting the experiment.
Once subjects had recorded their decisions, we randomly selected for each
subject and for each game, a number between 1 and 10. This number was
the sure amount of money he would receive had he chosen not to play and
keep the money. In case he had selected to play the game, his opponent was
selected randomly from the subjects in his session and was paid according to
the selected actions.
We end this section by commenting on several relevant aspects of the
instructions:
(a) Both games were shown in matrix form.
(b) Subjects were identified as players in the games, in particular, each
subject was told to be player 1 in both games.
(c) The social dilemma emerging in game 2 was emphasized by focusing
subjects’ attention to the diﬀerence between games 1 and 2 (see the
instructions in the appendix).
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Summarizing, our instructions were written in a game-theoretic language,
a language familiar to our experimental subjects, and made clear the dis-
tinction between games 1 and 2. Our goal was to make sure that every
experimental subject did understand the experiment.
3 Results
We first oﬀer a descriptive analysis of both the chosen strategies and the
elicited values for each game in each treatment. In order to analyze the
chosen strategies, we construct a binary index which takes the value 1 if
the strategy A was chosen and 0 otherwise. In Table 1, #B stands for the
number of subjects who chose strategy B in each game and #vB stands for
the number of subjects who chose strategy B and displayed a cut-oﬀ value.
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Game 1 Game 2 Game 2
Index Value Index Value Index Value
Mean 0, 96 5, 10 0, 80 5, 31 0, 85 5, 18
St.Dev. 0, 19 1, 81 0, 39 1, 85 0, 35 1, 23
n 102 94 102 93 55 55
#B 4 20 8
#vB 3 16 8
Table 1: Descriptive Analysis
Regarding Treatment 1, 9 subjects didn’t display a cut-oﬀ value1. How-
ever, all subjects in Treatment 2 displayed such a cut-oﬀ. One reasonable
explanation is that Treatment 2 was run a year after Treatment 1 and that
in between, we conjectured that those 9 subjects had not understood the
instructions of the experiment. So when running Treatment 2, we explained
the instructions very carefully to make sure that all subjects had full under-
standing of the instructions. The fact than no subject in Treatment 2 failed
to have the cut-oﬀ reinforces our explanation and allows us to skip those 9
subjects from our subsequent analysis.
18 subjects failed in both games, whereas one additional subject only failed in game 1.
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We now test whether there was any rank-order eﬀect in Treatment 1. To
check this eﬀect we compare the choices and values in PDG across treatments.
We use non parametric tests for unrelated samples.
• Chosen strategies: both the Mann-Whitney (Z = −0, 78; p = 0, 43)
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Z = 0, 30; p = 1, 00) tests do no reject the
null hypothesis of equal distribution.
• Elicited values: both the Mann-Whitney (Z = −0, 68; p = 0, 49) and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Z = 0, 51; p = 0, 95) tests do no reject the null
hypothesis of equal distribution.
These tests let us to consider that both samples are drawn from the same
population. In particular, and focusing on chosen strategies, we observe that
24 subjects (16 in Treatment 1 and 8 subjects in Treatment 2) played the co-
operative strategy in the PDG. This amounts to 16,21 % of the experimental
subjects.2
4 The added-value of the Payment Card
The analysis of the last section reveals that around 16% of the experimental
subjects did perceive a change in the game 2 in comparison to game 1, and
that this variation was dramatic enough to trigger a change in the played
strategy (they switched from playing strategy A in game 1 to play strategy
B in game 2). Hence, from the perspective of the played strategies, which
is the usual point of view considered by the literature, 16% of the subjects
solved the social dilemma by choosing the cooperative strategy and 84% of
the subjects solved the conflict by choosing the non-cooperative action (we
postpone the discussion of these results to section 5.)
Our point in this paper is that the played strategy criteria makes a very
coarse classification of subjects, and that it is possible to get a finer clas-
sification by splitting the non-cooperative category in subjects who did not
perceive any change in the relevant structure of the games and subjects whose
perceived change was not big enough to trigger the cooperative strategy. We
will do so by taking into account the information elicited by the payment
cards.
2If we include those 9 subjects who did not displayed a cut-oﬀ value, then the proportion
of subjects who played the cooperative strategy is 17,83%.
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The starting point is the following classification of experimental subjects:
• Non-Cooperative Subjects: Subjects who select strategy A in both
games (76 subjects).
• Cooperative Subjects: Subjects who select strategy A in the first game
and strategy B in the second game. These subjects are those who
display a cooperative behaviour according to the literature of other—
regarding preferences (14 subjects).
• Other Subjects: Subjects who selects strategy A (B) in the first game
and strategy B (A) in the second game (3 subjects).
Next table displays this classification together with information regarding
subjects’ payments cards, where vi stands for the elicited value in game i.
Behaviour v2 < v1 v2 = v1 v2 > v1 Total
Non-Coop. 10 50 16 76
Cooperative 6 3 5 14
Other 1 1 1 3
Total 17 54 22 93
Table 2: Evolution of Actions & Values
We now ask ourselves which kind of information conveys the elicited value
of a game. Our starting point is the traditional paradigm of Economic The-
ory: subjects behave as maximizing a utility function. It is true that the
precise form of the utility function will diﬀer among competing theories, but
we believe that there will be no strong complaints if we assume that the
basic ingredients of the maximizing function are: (i) the utility attached to
the payoﬀs profiles of the game, and (ii) the beliefs that the decision maker
holds about the rival’s play. These two elements conforms too our view the
perceived structure of the game in a wide sense: on one side, the payoﬀ ma-
trix and the transformation into a utility matrix and on the other side, the
fact that the received utility depends upon the rival play.
Focus on the non-cooperative players, i.e. on those subjects who played
strategy A in both games. According to the previous paragraph, we assume
that diﬀerent values across games imply diﬀerent perceived structures of the
games. Recalling that the unique diﬀerence in the payoﬀ profiles between
games 1 and 2 is the emergence of the social dilemma, we conclude that
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the change in the perceived structure of the game is related to the social
dilemma.
Hence, a subject who played the same strategy but displayed a diﬀerent
value across games is a subject who concede an eﬀect to the appearance of
the social dilemma. This eﬀect might occur either on his own utility matrix
(and in this case we say that for this subject the social dilemma matters to
him), or on his belief about his rival’s play (and in this case we say that this
subject believes that the social dilemma matters to his rival). Our results
show that 26 non-cooperative players (out of 93 subjects, 27,9%) belong to
this category.
On the contrary, a subject who played the same strategy and displayed the
same value in both games is a subject who denies any eﬀect to the emergence
of the social dilemma, neither to him nor to his rival. Our results show that
50 out of 93 subjects (53,76%) belong to this category.
But we can go beyond by assuming a particular utility function. We take
for instance the other-regarding preferences model, proposed by Andreoni
and Miller (2002) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) among others. Under this
model, we can state that any change in values for the non-cooperative players
will be caused by a change in beliefs, because the payoﬀ profile of strategy A
is the same in both games. Even more, assuming the standard distribution of
the parameter which measures the utility loss from advantageous inequality,3
we can identify the direction of movement of the beliefs: subjects displaying
v2 > v1 are subjects who believe that the rival is more likely to play the
cooperative strategy in the PDG (17,20%), whereas subjects displaying v2 <
v1 are subjects who believe that the rival is less likely to play the cooperative
3Under this model, the utility attached to a particular payoﬀ profile is
ui (πi, π−i) = πi − αmax {0, π−i − πi}− βmax {0, πi − π−i}
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume the following distribution of preferences regarding ad-
vantageous inequality: β = 0 (30%), β = 0, 25 (30%) and β = 0, 6 (40%). So the expected
utility of strategy A is
EUA = 4 · (1− p) + (8− 5β) · p
where p is the subjective probability of the rival playing strategy B. Observe that
(8− 5β) > 4 for the full support of the distribution of the parameter β. Hence, it follows
that
∂EUA
∂p > 0
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strategy in the PDG (10,75%).
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have classified subjects facing a prisoners’ dilemma game
by the extent to which they believed that the social dilemma involved in the
game was important to trigger the cooperative strategy either to them or to
the rivals. Our taxonomy shows that (i) 16% of the subjects responded to
the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining
subjects (84%) did not played the cooperative strategy and moreover, 53%
of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all.
Our first comment must be on the small proportion of cooperative play
that we observe in our experiment. Even though the current payoﬀs of the
PDG were designed to prompt cooperative behaviour, we only get 16% of
cooperation. We think that the background of the experimental subjects
is responsible for this small cooperative ratio. Subjects were students from
intermediate level economics courses, who have been exposed to game theo-
retic courses. So we believe that this background invalidates the comparison
of our results to those in the literature: our subjects have being trained to
behave in a non-cooperative way.
Being this true, still a fascinating result is that half of the subjects, even
though the exposure to game theoretical ideas was common knowledge, re-
vealed that the social dilemma implicit in the prisoners’ dilemma was a dis-
tinguishing feature of the game. And this is precisely the added-value of our
mechanism. We can go beyond observed behaviour and detect those subjects
who, while recognizing that the social dilemma was relevant, did not display
a cooperative behaviour. One might read our results as follows: exposure
to game theoretic courses has a 50% eﬀectiveness. It is plainly true, but he
will miss our main point: several features of the games influence subjects be-
haviour at two diﬀerent levels, (i) assessment of the game and (ii) displayed
behaviour. By focusing on observed behaviour we miss one of the two levels.
Our methodology lets us recover the missing level.
Finally, one might wonder to what extent the mechanism used to elicit the
value of the game is reliable. We must say that our procedure is reminiscent
of the BDM procedure, and as we said before, this mechanism has been
shown unreliable. However, we believe our mechanism to be superior because
it exposes the subject to repeatedly choose between the game and several
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amounts of money. This sequential procedure keeps subjects’ attention on
the task and in our view, yields a more accurate estimation of the value of
the game, in comparison to the BDM one-shot mechanism.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we use a technique reminiscent of the BDM procedure to get
knowledge of the values that subjects attached to a prisoners’ dilemma game
and to a related game not involving any social dilemma. By comparing
the values and the actions played by the subjects, we are able to classify
subjects in diﬀerent categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social
dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects
(84%) did not played the cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the
subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all.
The information revealed by the value of the game might be very valuable
for disentangling the relationship between joint payoﬀs and beliefs in the
explanation of subjects’ behaviour in games. The value depends of both of
them and without additional information we can not isolate their eﬀects. But
if in addition to the elicited value, we elicit the beliefs by using for example
a quadratic scoring rule (see Schotter and Sopher (2003) and Nyarko and
Schooter (2002)) then our mechanism might isolate the belief eﬀect and the
joint payoﬀ eﬀect. We leave this issue for further research.
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Appendix: Instructions.
Welcome4 to this experiment in decision making. Instructions are very easy
although feel free to ask a monitor questions as they arise.
You will be confronted to two diﬀerent situations. Attached to these
instructions you will find two decision-sheets. In each of them you will write
your choices.
In the first decision-sheet its appear a 2-person game with 2 attached
strategies: A and B [a matrix identical to Game 1 of Figure 1 appears in
the decision-sheet 1]. YOU ARE PLAYER 1 and your rival (player 2) is
unknown. Your first choice is to decide between A and B. Please put your
decision within the box named “your decision is ____” (located below the
matrix).
Your earnings are dependent on your choice and your rival choice. Below
the decision box you will find a table with 10 choices.
Payment Card
1st choice: Play or 1 euro for sure
2nd choice: Play or 2 euros for sure
3rd choice: Play or 3 euros for sure
4th choice: Play or 4 euros for sure
5th choice: Play or 5 euros for sure
6th choice: Play or 6 euros for sure
7th choice: Play or 7 euros for sure
8th choice: Play or 8 euros for sure
9th choice: Play or 9 euros for sure
10th choice: Play or 10 euros for sure
The meaning of each choice (row) is the following: what do you prefer 1C=
for sure or playing the game (an obtaining its payoﬀs)?. Please mark your
choice: “1 C= for sure” or “playing the game”. In the second row the decision
is similar: what do you prefer 2 C= for sure or playing the game?.
Then, in each situation you have to decide between some amount of money
(for sure) and playing the game. Remember that you should mark 10 choices.
4Original instructions are in Spanish. The aim of this translation is to reproduce, as
accurate as possible, the meaning of the original ones.
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In the second decision-form (sheet number 2) you will find a very similar
situation to the one described in sheet 1. You have to decide if A or B
and then choose if “play the game” or “get an amount of money for sure”
(remember, you should mark 10 choices). Note that attached payoﬀs to B &
B has been changed from game 1 (0,0) to game 2 (7,7).
Please, remember that you should mark your identification number in the
box named “identification number”. Once your decisions are filled, please
complete the questionnaire (gender, city and pocket-money per week); note
that your name is not necessary.
Upon completion of the session the amount you make will be paid to you
in cash. Using a ten-sided dice, one of the ten choices of the payment card
will be selected for each subject in each game. You will be paid according
to your decisions. Your rival (if necessary) will randomly be chosen from the
experimental pool.
The experiment has started. Communication among subjects its strictly
forbidden.
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